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Abstract
A large strand of research has argued that democracy with its broad representation and
electoral accountability is beneficial for the provision of public goods to the general population.
However, there is a large variation in how the existing democratic regimes perform, implying
that democratic institutions are not sufficient to secure people’s wellbeing. The aim of this
paper is to explore the sources of this variation. With the point of departure in theories
on democracy, quality of government, and public goods provision, we posit that the way
democracies perform in the delivery of public goods to their citizens depends on the presence
of good quality institutions that shape the implementation of public policies. Using a mixed
method design, this paper both empirically tests this proposition and offers an in-depth
investigation into the mechanisms behind the interdependent relationship. In the first stage of
our analysis, we explicitly test the conditional effects of democracy and quality of government
on public goods provision using water quality as an example of such public good. The results
show that democracy is associated with higher water quality only in countries where quality
of government is high. In contexts with low governmental quality, more democracy even
seems to be associated with higher water pollution. In the second stage of our analysis, we
proceed with examining the mechanisms of how poor quality of government disrupts the
positive effects of democracy on people’s access to safe drinking water using interview data
from a typical case of Moldova.
1 Introduction
The third wave of democratization has brought up much interest in the performance of
democratic governments. The existing literature is filled with empirical studies exploring
the effects of democracy on different indicators of human wellbeing (e.g., Helliwell, 1994;
Przeworski, 2000; Gerring et al., 2005; Ross, 2006; McGuire, 2010). However, there is a large
variation in the performance of the existing democracies that is largely underresearched. The
aim of this paper is to explore the sources of this variation.
Political regimes with developed democratic institutions are believed to provide more welfare
to their citizens than less free political systems. Regular free and fair elections with universal
suffrage, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and opportunities for deliberation
are said to create favorable conditions for the wide public service delivery. Aiming to
please the majority of the electorate and win their support in the next elections, democratic
rules supposedly have an incentive to deliver widely demanded public goods1 as opposed
to the autocrats who rather focus on satisfying wishes of the narrow elite to gain support
necessary to stay in power (Bueno De Mesquita, 2003; Lake and Baum, 2001; McGuire and
Olson, 1996; McGuire, 2010). As citizens can replace political leaders who do not deliver,
democratic leaders are assumed to be more accountable to the general public than the
autocrats (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Sen, 1999). Freedom of expression can help raise
the salience of political failures in public goods provision, which makes citizens more likely
to hold politicians accountable, while freedom of association allows citizens to mobilize and
lobby their interests for more public goods provision.
Despite there are theoretical reasons to believe that democratic institutions are favorable to
the provision of essential public goods, the existing democracies today do not deliver social
welfare uniformly well. The literature has offered a number of explanations why this can be
the case. Democratic leaders are known to be short-sighted and therefore inclined to focus
more on outcomes that bring visible benefits in the short-run, while the provision of many
public goods requires long-term commitments (Haggard, 1991). Opportunities for clientelism
or vote-buying can distract the attention of political leaders from the universal supply of
public goods and let them focus on the provision of targeted goods or private benefits instead
(Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt, 2000; Keefer, 2007). Additionally, democracies can simply lack the
1In economics, public goods are defined as goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. However, in
political science, it is common to refer to them as universal benefits that people receive from the government,
such as healthcare, education, clean water supply, or electricity, although in practice, people can be excluded
from these benefits (Min, 2015). As in this paper we aim to contribute to the political science literature on
public goods provision, we refer to public goods consistently with their understanding in the political science,
although we acknowledge that it is not uncontroversial.
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capacity to deliver the desired outcomes due to malfunctioning institutions (Rothstein, 2011).
Empirical research on the relationship between the democratic forms of government and
public goods provision have predominantly reported positive effects: more democratic states
tend to deliver more public goods and services than non-democratic countries (e.g., Lake
and Baum, 2001; Bueno De Mesquita, 2003; Deacon, 2009). Some scholars evidence that it
is experience with democratic institutions that secures public goods provision rather than
the current level of democracy (e.g., Keefer, 2007; McGuire, 2010; Gerring et al., 2012; Min,
2015). While the role of factors that disrupt the functioning of democracies are well-abound
in the literature, very few empirical studies actually account for them in their statistical tests,
thus failing to explain the variation in the performance of existing democratic regimes. The
studies that do, however, do not seem to provide convincing evidence of the mechanisms
behind the relationship patterns they find (Hanson, 2015; Knutsen, 2013; Boräng et al.,
2016).
In this paper, we address both these research gaps by using nested research design suggested
by Lieberman (2005). First, we argue that while democratic institutions shape access to the
political power and preference aggregation in the decision-making, they do not necessarily
guarantee that these decisions get implemented. In order to better understand the variation
in the performance of democracies in public goods provision, we have to turn our attention
to the political institutions that shape the exercise of the political power or rules that shape
the implementation of public policies. We further posit that the performance of democracies
is conditional on the presence of such well-functioning institutions and test our argument
by modeling the interaction between democracy and governmental quality. In particular,
we test the interdependent effects between these two sets of political institutions on the
provision of water quality, measured with biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and the level of
wastewater treatment, as an example of a public good. Second, we proceed by investigating
the mechanisms behind the interdependent relationship by choosing a typical case of Moldova,
which scores high on most democracy indicators, however, exhibits persistently low levels
of institutional quality. To illustrate the case, we use original triangulated interview data
collected by the authors in spring 2016.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we introduce the theoretical framework of the
study and hypothesize how and why the quality of institutions that shape the implementation
of public policies can moderate the effect of democracy on the provision of public goods.
Second, we introduce the research design and present the analysis, starting with methods
and findings in the Large-N part and then proceeding with the analysis of interview data
from the typical case. We conclude by discussing our findings.
2
2 Theoretical background and previous research
2.1 Democracy and public goods provision
Democratic institutions are believed to benefit people’s welfare. First, “rule of the people”
in itself implies that decision-making process reflects the interests of the majority. Both in
democratic and authoritarian regimes, political leaders are accountable to the support group
that keeps them in power, which provides the incentive for rulers to meet the demands of
this support group or “winning coalition” (Bueno De Mesquita, 2003). As in democracies
the winning coalition comprises of voters that elect political leaders, political leaders benefit
from addressing the interests of the majority of voters rather than focusing on the interests of
the few, as is the case in non-democratic regimes. It can simply be more costly for political
leaders in democracies to buy support of the majority with private goods or vote-buying than
commit to public service delivery and satisfy the demands of the majority (Lake and Baum,
2001; McGuire and Olson, 1996). This makes democratic rules more likely than the autocrats
to extend social welfare universally and deliver public goods, such as education, healthcare,
water or sanitation (McGuire, 2010).
Second, developed freedom of expression in democracies facilitates the flow of information
and can help people recognize lack of public goods provision as a political failure. This
increases the salience of political problems and allows citizens to hold politicians accountable
for insufficient public service delivery by giving their votes to alternative candidates in the
coming elections (Sen, 1999). Third, freedom of association also helps people mobilize into
civil society organizations or protests, lobby their interests in politics, and demand public
goods.
However, despite there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that democracy is associated
with higher public service delivery, many democracies do not seem to do uniformly well
in safeguarding the wellbeing of their citizens. There are a number of reasons brought up
in the literature explaining why this can be the case. First, due to short electoral cycles,
democratic leaders have an intrinsic motivation to prefer projects that take short time to
implement and that produce visible outcomes quickly (Haggard, 1991; Keefer, 2007). It
makes it easier for the population to judge their performance and increases the likelihood
they will gain support in the next elections. Providing public goods, however, is often a
long-term undertaking and requires continuous policy commitments that can withstand
the change in governments. Second, due to short time horizons, politicians often engage
in vote-buying and clientelism to secure support in the coming elections, attending to the
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interests of narrower groups rather than providing universal benefits (Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt,
2000). Third, some democracies are simply incapable of delivering outcomes desired by the
citizens due to malfunctioning institutions and weak state capacity (Bäck and Hadenius, 2008;
Sikkink, 1991; Rothstein, 1998, 2011; Miller, 2000; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2012; Fukuyama, 2011, 2013).
Some empirical studies find that citizens of more democratic regimes tend to receive more
social benefits than citizens of less democratic states (e.g., Lake and Baum, 2001; Bueno De
Mesquita, 2003; Deacon, 2009). Others show that it is experience with democracy that matters
for public goods provision rather than the current stage of democratic development (Keefer,
2007; McGuire, 2010; Gerring et al., 2012; Min, 2015). However, one of the major drawbacks
of these studies is that they do not account for factors that might disrupt functioning of
democracies in public goods provision and do not explain the variation in the existing
democracies.
Democratic institutions shape access to political power and preferences aggregation in the
decision-making and do not necessarily guarantee that these decisions get implemented. In
order to fully understand the performance of democracies, we have to also turn our attention
to how political power is exercised or institutions that shape the implementation of political
decisions. As Huntington (1991, 9–10) notes:
Governments produced by elections may be: inefficient, corrupt, short-sighted,
irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies
demanded by the public good. These make such governments undesirable but
they do not make them undemocratic. (. . . ) [Therefore,] democracy [should be]
clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political systems.
2.2 Quality of government and public goods provision
Institutions that shape the implementation of policies include rules that guide the functioning
of public administration and therefore determine states’ bureaucratic capacity, the prevalence
of rule of law that secures obedience to laws, and the extent of corruption, in both grand
and petty forms (Rothstein et al., 2012; Charron and Lapuente, 2010, 2011). These aspects
are crucial determinants of government quality and they may affect the performance of
democracies in public goods provision in a number of ways.
Favorable rules shaping the functioning of administrative apparatus stem from the Weberian
model of a capable bureaucracy that implies meritocratic recruitment and predictable career
4
with long-term rewards for the bureaucrats, such as job security and foreseeable salary.
Employment by merit increases the likelihood that the chosen employees will be competent in
their responsibilities. Provision of many public goods, such as clean water or air, often requires
extensive expertise and well-developed action plans oriented to long-term implementation and
quality maintenance. Competent professionals, using their knowledge and experience, are
more likely to develop these action plans in effective manner. Predictable career and salary
create motivation for individuals to stay within the government and thus increase competence
over time. Attractive employment conditions also reduce incentives for bureaucrats to engage
in corrupt practices for personal short-term gain (Evans and Rauch, 1999). Strong well-
functioning bureaucracy can also constrain democratic leaders in their actions and secure
policy implementation despite incentives for short-signed behavior in democracies (Cornell,
2014).
Strong rule of law, which implies obedience to the law both by the general public and
lawmakers and equality of all actors under the law before the courts, can secure commitments
to policy objectives and thus facilitate reaching long-term goals, such as many initiatives
directed towards public goods provision. Weak rule of law also creates opportunities for public
officials to misuse their office for private gain and engage in corruption, which is detrimental
for public goods provision.
Wide embezzlement of public funds diminishes the extractive capacity of the state as public
revenues are diverted from public goods provision to government officials’ private use. It also
reduces incentives for individuals to pay taxes, which could otherwise contribute to public
goods budget. Petty bribery decreases the coercive capacity of the state and hampers policy
implementation, as bureaucrats can have an incentive accept bribes instead of enforcing
compliance (López and Mitra, 2000; Damania et al., 2003).
Quality of government may also impact policy choices of democratic leaders. There are few
incentives for politicians to invest in public goods provision if they know that current institu-
tions make public administration incapable of successful policy implementation (Dahlström
et al., 2013). Additionally, grand corruption can pave the way for special interests to increase
their influence over decision-making in democracies and divert policy preferences away from
the public good. In a similar manner, if judges are not independent and can be bribed, it
is easier for powerful interest groups to impose their preferences on the courts and override
laws.
Some claim that for delivering certain public goods and services, some forms of corruption can
be functional. For example, ethnic favoritism or clientelism can favor the delivery of targeted
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goods, such as schools, healthcare centers or water boreholes (Zarazaga, 2014; Walton, 2013;
Huntington, 1968). In this paper, we focus on those welfare benefits that are difficult to
exclude people from and that require universal provision. We believe that these types of goods
pose a particular challenge for democracies, as they usually bring diffused benefits and take a
long time to deliver. We posit that high quality of institutions that shape the implementation
of public policies help democracies provide public goods, while low institutional quality is a
key factor that keeps current democratic governments from successfully delivering welfare to
their citizens. Our hypothesis to test is:
H1 Performance of democracies in public goods provision is conditional on their quality of
government2
3 Research design and analysis
3.1 Water quality as a public good
In our study, we test the proposed hypothesis on water quality as an example of a public good.
In the economics literature, pure public goods are defined as goods that are non-excludable
and non-rivalrous. As it is possible to clean up water resources selectively, providing safe
water only to certain areas and not others, and, naturally, to limit access to water, it is
problematic to classify water quality as a pure public good. Instead, it would rather be
referred to as quasi-public good in economics. Nevertheless, political scientists often refer to
access to safe drinking water as a public good that ideally should be provided universally and
enjoyed by everyone, even if it not always is. In this article, we follow the tradition set by
political science to achieve consistency and refer to water quality as a public good, although
we acknowledge that this approach is not uncontroversial.
Provision of clean drinking water is a complex long-term undertaking. While building pipes
and boreholes can ensure access to water within a relatively short time frame, reaching and
maintaining good drinking water quality is a long-term project. It is connected to reducing
water emissions, building and maintaining water treatment plants, as well as maintaining
water’s self-cleaning properties by sustaining the health of aquatic ecosystems and biodiversity.
As access to clean drinking water is people’s basic need and is essential for human wellbeing,
the issue of water quality has seemingly high visibility. However, it takes a relatively long
2While based on the existing theories we have some expectations on how the relationship patterns in
interaction can unfold, we do not formulate specific hypothesis, letting the patterns reveal themselves during
the empirical analysis.
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time before the results from actions to purify water sources become visible to the general
public. This slow response of water quality to policy actions and complexity of the issue
provides a constant incentive for the democratic rulers to focus on other public policies,
that yield short-term results, simply to make it easier for the public to evaluate government
actions.3
The water issues are complex. Water ecosystems are intimately dependent on the quality of
forest surrounding the waterways and therefore are inherently connected to forest management.
It requires strong expert knowledge and awareness of the complexity of water management
problems. Water management, therefore, requires consultation with scientists, a coherence of
goals between different government agencies, such as forestry and health, as well as competent
agency heads aware of the complexity of the issues.
In our empirical analysis, we first test the proposed hypothesis, using time-series cross-section
data on water quality across the globe. Second, we conduct an in-depth investigation into
the political and institutional obstacles to the provision of safe drinking water in democracies
by using interview and documentary data from the case of Moldova.
3.2 Large-N
3.2.1 Data
In gauging our dependent variables, we rely on a number of measures. First, we measure the
degree of pollution in the water bodies using data on biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)
from the World Bank (2015). BOD reflects the amount of oxygen that bacteria living in the
water consume to break down organic pollutants, such as sewage or excessive amounts of
dead algae caused by nitrates and phosphates coming from fertilizers, industrial waste, and
landfills. This makes BOD a suitable proxy for the level of pollution in countries’ freshwater
resources, with high values corresponding to high levels of water pollution. The measure is
comparable across countries and is available for 102 states over years 1986-2007, unbalanced.4
We weight the measure by two parameters for comparison. First, we divide it by countries’
population size to receive the amount of water pollution per capita. Second, we divide it by
the total volume of internal renewable water resources available in countries, measured in 109
3Additionally, water quality to a certain degree depends on the factors outside government control, such as
e.g. polluting and extractive behavior of the neighboring countries sharing a particular water body. Diffused
sources of pollution make it difficult to isolate the effect of government competence on the actual outcome by
concealing government efforts in delivering access to clean drinking water.
4Unfortunately, there are no data available online on BOD after 2007.
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m3 of average renewable flows per year, to receive the amount of pollution relative to rivers’
capacity to handle it. The data on population come from Gleditsch (Gleditsch, 2011), while
data on internal renewable water resources come from Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO, 2016).
Second, we gauge countries’ effort to improve water quality by using the measure of the
wastewater treatment levels taken from the Environmental Performance Index (Hsu et al.,
2014). The measure captures the proportion of wastewater from households, municipalities,
and industries that undergoes at least primary treatment5 before it is released into the water
bodies, weighted by the number of people connected to the sewage network. The measure is
available for 180 countries for the year 2014 and varies from 0 to 100, where higher values
indicate higher levels of wastewater treatment.
The two dependent variables complement each other. While the level of wastewater treatment
is an input-measure and reflects the presence of plants for treating wastewater, as well as the
capacity to which they are used, BOD is an output-measure and gauges the level of actual
pollution in waters, showing the effectiveness of these plants.
We measure democracy by using polyarchy index from the Varieties of Democracy project
(Coppedge et al., 2016; Pemstein et al., 2015). The index reflects the extent to which electoral
democracy principle is developed in countries and accounts for the degree of suffrage, freedom
of expression, freedom of association, the fairness of elections, and whether the executive is
appointed through popular elections. We rescale the index to take values from 0 to 10 where
higher values correspond to more democratic regimes.
Our measure of the quality of government (QoG) comes from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG, 2014) and provides an estimate of the three main aspects of QoG in
countries: the extent of corruption, the strength of rule of law, and the level of bureaucratic
quality. The corruption indicator captures how widespread different forms of corruption
are, including patronage, nepotism, clientelism, job reservations, unofficial party funding
and close ties between business and politics. The “law and order” indicator accounts for
the strength of the judicial system and public obedience with the law, while the indicator
gauging bureaucratic quality shows the capacity of the public administration to perform
its tasks without intervention from politics and covers issues of meritocratic employment
in the bureaucracies. Together, the indicators provide a comprehensive idea of the level of
governmental quality in countries. The rescaled index ranges from 0 to 10 where higher
5Primary treatment includes basic processes that remove suspended soils from water and reduces BOD
(Hsu et al., 2014).
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values refer to a higher quality of government.6
We make sure to control for relevant factors and tease out their effect on our dependent
variables. First and foremost, we include gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, measured
in constant 2005 US dollars (Heston et al., 2012). On the one hand, countries at higher levels of
economic development tend to pollute more. On the other hand, we also expect that countries
with higher income have more financial resources to address water pollution problems and
build more water treatment plants. Second, we include the measure of population density
and urbanization rates available from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015).
On the one hand, higher population density and urbanization create higher pressure on water
resources; on the other hand, however, it is easier to provide social services to more densely
living populations and to urbanized areas (McGuire, 2010). In our between- models, we
additionally control for the area size, as it requires more effort to clean water bodies and
build wastewater treatment plants if the territory is large. We also include the measure of
countries’ latitude to account for unobserved geographical factors (La Porta et al., 1999). In
several models where our dependent variable is BOD per capita, we also add the volume of
internal renewable water resources in the list of control variables to tap into the capacity
of water bodies to handle pollution (FAO, 2016). However, the data on water resources are
limited in availability and therefore, we only use these models as complementary to compare
the effects. Summary statistics and the correlation between the variables are available in
Appendix B.
3.2.2 Method
When testing our hypothesis with the BOD indicator as the dependent variable, we take
into account both variation between countries and developments within states and use the
within-between estimator, recently suggested by Bell and Jones (2015) and based on the
earlier work by Bartels (2008), Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2005), and Mundlak (1978). The method
allows us to use random effects by dealing with the issue of correlated errors. In particular,
we include country mean of each independent variable together with its calculated deviation
6In the robustness checks, we rerun the analysis with the Freedom house/Polity IV measure from Hadenius
and Teorell (2005) as an alternative indicator of democracy and a measure of corruption from the Varieties of
Democracy project as an alternative measure of institutional quality. Freedom House/Polity IV indicator is
an average of Freedom House and Polity IV democracy scores and has shown to perform better in terms
of reliability and validity than each of the indices separately (Hadenius and Teorell, 2005). V-dem political
corruption index is a composite measure of executive, legislative, judicial and public sector corruption and
therefore taps upon many of the aspects of the quality of government index used in the main analysis. Results
from the robustness checks are presented in Appendix D.
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from the mean and use the latter instead of the original raw values. Thus we obtain separate
coefficients for between-country and within-country variation using the equation:
yit = β0 + β1(xit − xi) + β2xi + β3zi + (ui + eit) (1)
where i is a country, t – year, β0 is the intercept, x is a vector of the independent time-varying
variables, z is a vector of time-invariant variables, u is an error in the between-equation, and
e is an error in the within-equation.
When testing our hypothesis with the level of wastewater treatment as the dependent variable,
we analyze the variation across countries using simple OLS regression with robust standard
errors, where all independent variables are lagged 4 years:7
yt = β0 + β1xt−4 + e (2)
where t is 2014, β0 is the intercept, x is a vector of the independent variables and e is an
error term.
3.2.3 Results
Models 1-6 in Table 1 present results from equation 1, separating between- and within-
parts into different sections.8 Between-part shows the coefficients based on the analysis of
the variance between countries, averaged over the time period, while within-part presents
the coefficients produced in the analysis of developments within countries over time. In
Models 1-4 we use the logged value of the biochemical oxygen demand per capita as our
dependent variable to measure water pollution. Models 3 and 4 introduce the volume of
internal renewable water resources as an additional control variable. Models 5 and 6 treat
logged value of the biochemical oxygen demand weighted by the volume of internal renewable
water resources as the dependent variable.
The results in models 1 and 3 show that democracy and quality of government do not seem to
have independent effects on the levels of water pollution. However, when BOD is weighted by
the volume of rivers in model 5, more democracy seem to be associated with lower biochemical
7The choice of four-year lag is arbitrary. We assume that it takes time for the independent varaibles to
have a measurable effect on our dependent variable, and therefore, tested our results with two-, three-, four-,
and five-year lags of indpendent variables. The results are similar.
8Despite the fact that the results in the within- part are insignificant, we still include both within- and
between- parts in the same table, as they are parts of the same equation and cannot be separated.
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oxygen demand, which is also consistent with the findings by Li and Reuveny (2006). Models
2, 4, and 6 specify that the effects of democracy and quality of government on the level of
water pollution are not linear but are dependent on one another. Judging by the R2, the
interaction models (2, 4, and 6) explain 6% more variance in the dependent variable compared
to models where the effects of democracy and QoG are modeled as independent (2, 3, and
5). The negative sign on the interaction coefficient implies that the variables decrease each
other’s effect on the level of water pollution when their effects are positive and increase each
other’s effect when their effects are negative. The results seem to only be significant for the
between-part of the equation, while the results for the within-part are insignificant, implying
that our models only explain variation between countries but not changes over time.
Models 7 and 8 show the results for Equation 2, where the dependent variable is the level of
wastewater treatment relative to the population connected to the sewage. Higher values thus
mean better performance and therefore the interpretation of the results is opposite to the
previous models. The results reflect a similar picture. Model 7 shows that higher quality of
government is associated with lower level of wastewater treatment, controlling for economic,
demographic, and geographical factors. The effect of democracy is insignificant. Model 8
reveals that the effects of democracy and quality of government are interdependent. More
quality of government seems to increase the effect of democracy on the level of wastewater
treatment, while more democracy seems to intensify the effect of quality of government.
To get a more nuanced picture of how democracy and quality of government interact in
their effects on water quality, we proceed by plotting their conditional marginal effects. As
the results only seem to explain the differences across countries not developments over time
within states, we only build graphs for the between-sample. Figure 1 presents the plots for
each of the interaction models. The patterns on the figures are consistent with one another.
Figures in column a show the effects of democracy on water quality at different levels of
quality of government, while figures in column b present the effects of quality of government
on water quality at different levels of democracy. The histogram overlaying the graphs shows
the distribution of the variables on the x-axis, and y-axis on the right specifies the percentage
of observations that vertical bars represent.
Plot 2a on Figure 1 shows that more democracy is associated with lower levels of biochemical
oxygen demand only when QoG is relatively high and has reached the level of approximately
7.5 out 10, which is the level of Spain. The histogram on the graph shows that countries with
QoG higher than 7.5 comprise around 31% of our sample. When QoG is relatively low, more
democracy even seems to be associated with higher BOD (higher pollution). This relationship
applies for countries that score lower than 5 on the 0-10 QoG scale, which is the level of
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Table 1. Democracy, quality of government and water quality
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Between-part
Democracy 0.034 0.367∗∗∗ 0.004 0.351∗ -0.366∗∗∗ 0.375 0.201 -6.220∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.096) (0.042) (0.125) (0.094) (0.255) (0.897) (1.602)
QoG 0.026 0.415∗ 0.139 0.524∗∗∗ 0.130 0.921∗ 6.681∗∗∗ -2.298
(0.080) (0.131) (0.107) (0.139) (0.214) (0.325) (1.359) (2.187)
Democracy∗QoG -0.059∗∗∗ -0.062∗ -0.128∗ 1.251∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.042) (0.290)
GDP per capita (log) 0.502∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.424∗ 0.449∗ 0.527† 0.573† 3.369† 3.716†
(0.132) (0.132) (0.144) (0.149) (0.310) (0.303) (1.911) (1.942)
Population density (log) 0.077 0.099† 0.082 0.082 0.597∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 3.086∗∗ 3.455∗∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.059) (0.059) (0.167) (0.152) (1.414) (1.351)
Urban population -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.216∗∗ 0.227∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.086) (0.083)
Area (log) 0.002 0.030 -0.022 -0.056 -0.072 -0.068 1.300 1.051
(0.042) (0.041) (0.081) (0.094) (0.127) (0.129) (1.231) (1.202)
Latitude 1.474∗ 2.004∗∗∗ 0.426 1.381 2.580 4.408∗∗ 51.283∗∗∗ 44.889∗∗∗
(0.542) (0.510) (0.831) (0.926) (1.732) (1.719) (11.613) (11.470)
Water resources (log) 0.046 0.079
(0.049) (0.057)
Within-part
Democracy -0.041 -0.040 -0.053 -0.054 -0.053 -0.055
(0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.036) (0.034) (0.038)
QoG -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006
(0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Democracy∗QoG -0.003 0.008 0.012
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
GDP per capita (log) 0.165 0.166 0.197 0.201 0.219 0.225
(0.131) (0.132) (0.164) (0.167) (0.163) (0.166)
Population density (log) 0.407 0.412 0.423 0.419 1.304∗ 1.300∗
(0.350) (0.351) (0.420) (0.420) (0.408) (0.409)
Urban population 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant -3.631∗ -6.192∗∗∗ -3.120† -5.273∗ 1.943 -3.365 -94.104∗∗∗ -51.705∗∗
(1.145) (1.316) (1.606) (1.766) (2.907) (3.277) (22.192) (24.685)
Observations 750 750 618 618 618 618 128 128
R2 between 0.63 0.68 0.60 0.64 0.44 0.50 0.75 0.77
R2 within 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.21
Number of countries 84 84 69 69 69 69 128 128
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes no no
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. Model 1-4: DV: BOD per capita.
Model 5-6: DV: BOD relative to internal renewable water resources. Model 7-8: DV: level of wastewater treatment
relative to population connected to sewage. OLS for cross-country sample for 2014 with all independent variables
lagged 4 years 12
Tanzania. These countries comprise around 20% of the total sample. Plot 2b shows that
more QoG is associated with more water pollution in authoritarian regimes that score less
than 4 on the 0-10 democracy scale, which was the level of Russia in the early 2000s. These
authoritarian regimes comprise 17% of our all our cases. Plots 4a and 4b echo the patterns
reflected in plots 2a and 2b. However, when our dependent variable becomes weighted by
the volume of the internal renewable water resources (plots 6a and 6b) the negative effect of
democracy at low levels of QoG disappears, and democratic institutions seem to be associated
with lower water pollution already at the levels of QoG as low as 4.8.
Plots 8a and 8b show similar picture to the rest of the graphs, however, as the dependent
variable is the level of wastewater treatment as opposed to water pollution in the previous
models, the interpretation is reverse. Plot 8a illustrates that democracy is only associated
with higher levels of wastewater treatment when QoG is relatively high (higher than 6.5 out
of 10). In low-QoG settings (with QoG lower than 3.5 on the 0-10 scale), more democracy
even seems to be detrimental to wastewater treatment levels. Plot 8b shows that QoG is
beneficial for the levels of wastewater treatment in countries scoring above 4 on the 0-10
democracy scale, which is the level of Venezuela. These democratic and semi-democratic
regimes represent around 70% of our sample. In authoritarian states, QoG does not seem to
play a role for the wastewater treatment levels.
In sum, the results show that democracy and quality of government have complementary
effects on water quality: at low levels of quality of government, more democracy is only
associated with higher water pollution. However, democracy’s effect becomes positive in
contexts with high QoG. Similarly, more QoG has shown to correlate with higher levels of
water pollution in authoritarian regimes, but have not shown to matter in democracies. When
it comes to building and using wastewater treatment plants, however, the picture becomes
the opposite: QoG does not seem to matter in authoritarian regimes, while it is beneficial for
the level of wastewater treatment in regimes with democratic institutions. In the patterns we
found, there are four relationships that call for further exploration: how high QoG boosts the
effect of democracy, how low QoG disrupts the effects of democracy or how more democracy
becomes detrimental at low QoG, how authoritarian regimes with high QoG can pollute
water resources more and how democratic institutions intensify the positive effect of QoG on
the wastewater treatment initiatives.
To examine all patterns in depth is far beyond the scope of this paper. In our qualitative
investigation, we step away from comparative perspective leaving in-depth comparisons that
could help unpack the reasons behind the relatively worse or better performance across
institutional configurations for future research. Instead, here we explicitly focus on the
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Figure 1. Conditional marginal effects of democracy and quality of government
on water quality
14
Table 2. Four institutional configurations
QoG
High Low
Democracy
High Democracies
with high QoG
Democracies
with low QoG
Low Autocracies
with high QoG
Autocracies
with low QoG
performance of democratic regimes and explore the mechanisms behind one specific pattern
that stands out from our findings: how weak institutional quality undermines the functioning
of democracy for the delivery of safe water quality as a public good (Table 2).
3.3 Case study
To investigate the specific micro-mechanisms of how low quality of government can significantly
hamper provision of safe drinking water in democracies, we choose a typical case, which would
be representative of the group of countries that score high on democracy, low on indicators
of QoG, and have a low residual in our model. The country of Moldova fits all of these
conditions. Moldova scores high on democracy indicators available and at the same time has
low scores on indicators of governmental quality (see Table 3). Figure 2 positions Moldova
against other countries with respect to democracy and quality of government.
In the following section, we explain our case selection rationale or why Moldova offers a
particularly useful ground for examining the institutional factors hampering the provision of
safe drinking water in democracies.
3.3.1 Moldova as a case
Since establishing its independence in 1991, Moldova has emerged as one of the most
pluralistic and competitive countries among the new democracies of post-Communist Eurasia,
and developed strong freedom of expression (Crowther, 2013). President Voronin and his
Communist party, which came to power in 2001, tried to change this and took steps to
monopolize power by controlling businesses and media (Meister, 2011). However, he failed
to consolidate his political rule and the widespread popular discontent in 2009 culminated
in the “Twitter Revolution”, which swept to power a coalition of three parties – “Alliance
for European Integration” (AEI). The coalition included the Liberal-Democrats (PLDM),
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Table 3. Moldova’s scores on the indicators of Democracy and Quality of Gov-
ernment
Democracy Indicator Moldova’s
score
min-
max
QoG indicators Moldova’s
score
min-
max
Polyarchy Index,
V-Dem
0.72 0-1 Quality of Government,
ICRG
0.44 0-1
Political rights,
Freedom House
3 (free) 7-1 Control of Corruption,
World Bank
-0.69 -2.5-2.5
Civil liberties,
Freedom House
3 (free) 7-1 Rule of Law,
World Bank
-0.39 -2.5-2.5
Polity IV 9 0-10 Government Effectiveness,
World Bank
-0.64 -2.5-2.5
Freedom House/Polity IV 8.08 0-10 Corruption Perception
Index
29 100-1
Dichotomous index,
Cheibub
1 0-1 Political Corruption Index,
V-Dem
0.65 1-0
the Democrats (DM), and the Liberals (LM). In the parliamentary elections following the
revolution, the parties ran independently. But since none of them gathered enough votes to
form a government, they decided to create an alliance, and with the joint 59 seats pushed
the Communist party in opposition (42 seats). This gave rise to a pluralistic political climate
and media freedom in the country, and for this reason, we focus our analysis specifically on
the post-2009 period.
Despite the predominantly pluralistic nature of politics, however, Moldova continues to suffer
from low quality of government: weak rule of law, low quality of administrative apparatus and
particularly high levels of corruption (see Appendix B). Unsurprisingly, Moldovan population
also continues to lack access to safe drinking water. The problem is double-fold: (1) lack
of water supply, and (2) poor water quality. The access to waterpipe system is around 80
percent in the cities and 15 percent in the villages (Botnaru, 2014). However, neither of those
connected to water pipes have access to safe drinking water. Water available to citizens from
the local sources is often contaminated either by the microbial pollution or by high levels of
nitrates. Duca (2014) shows that about 1.9 million people are exposed to pollutants from
water, that is, more than a half of the country’s 3.5 million population.
One common explanation for the underperformance of democracies in the provision of safe
drinking water is the lack of financial and technical resources. Moldova is indeed one of
the poorest countries in Europe with GDP per capita of only USD 1525 for the year 2009.
However, absence of funding alone cannot account for this lingering problem, since many
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Figure 2. Moldova in the relationship between democracy and quality of gov-
ernment
international donors, including Swiss and Austrian Development Agencies, US AID, German
Society for International Cooperation and the European Union, have provided authorities with
extensive budgetary and technical support to remedy the situation. Despite this, however,
citizens’ access to safe drinking water has remained limited, and specialists continue to warn
about the health risks of drinking water from the conventional sources (authors’ interview
with an official from the Ministry of Environment, April 2016).
This combination of democratic qualities and availability of funds, with the persistence of
water problems, makes Moldova a particularly opportune case to examine how the specific
micro-mechanisms of low governmental quality hamper citizens’ access to one of the essential
public goods. To closely investigate these mechanisms, we have conducted fieldwork in
Moldova’s capital Chisinau throughout March-April 2016. To collect an in-depth and detailed
data, we have carefully studied various government memorandums and conventions on water
management, including the Moldovan Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy 2012, Moldovan
Water Law of 23 December 2011 (#272), Moldovan Law on public service of water supply
and the sewerage of 13 December 2013 (#303), Moldovan strategy on water supply and
sanitation for 2014-2028 of 20 March 2014 (#199). We also conducted 25 semi-structured
face-to-face interviews with some of the key stakeholders. The major stakeholders in the
water management include the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Healthcare, Ministry
of Regional Development and Construction, non-governmental organizations, scientific com-
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munity, and the international donor organizations, which provide extensive financial and
technical assistance for the water management reform. During our fieldwork, we aimed to get
insights from all of these key actors. We interviewed top-level government officials, including
one current and two former ministers, one deputy minister, as well as mid-level bureaucrats
from the three ministries. We also interviewed 6 representatives from donor and diplomatic
community, 5 heads of civil society organizations and environmental NGOs, 2 independent
consultants, 3 academics, and 2 investigative journalists. Given the sensitivity of data, the
interviewees were promised anonymity, and all the important details were triangulated with
other sources to warrant their accuracy/validity.
3.3.2 Water management challenges in Moldova
After the dramatic events of the 2009 ‘Twitter revolution’, the Alliance for European Inte-
gration (AEI) took the reins of power and pledged to undertake systematic reforms, aiming
at fighting corruption, improving the quality of life of Moldovans, and bringing the country
closer to the European Union governaning standards. The Democratic Party (PDM) was
backed by the second wealthiest businessman in the country, Vlad Plahotniuc, while the
Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) was funded, and also chaired, by the third richest busi-
nessmen, Vlad Filat. The third, and smaller member of the coalition, the Liberal Party (PL)
represented those voters that favored joining Romania. The tripartite coalition agreement,
signed in December 2010, defined the allocation of government offices between the parties.
Among other ministries, the Ministry of Environment was assigned to the PL, the Ministry
of Regional Development and Construction to the PDM, while the Ministry of Healthcare to
the PLDM.
The outspokenly pro-European and reform-oriented approach of the alliance led Western
donors to significantly step up the financial and technical assistance, which among other
issues aimed at improving citizens’ access to safe drinking water. This policy domain alone
in 2012 received 109 million Euros from external donors (State Chancellery of Moldova, 2013,
18). The Brussels was particularly active in this area and provided substantial support to help
Moldova get closer to European standards and particularly to the EU’s Water Framework
Directive. The other donors also included the World Bank, as well as the United States-, the
Swiss-, the Austrian-, and the German Development Agencies.
Provision of safe drinking water fell within the responsibility of three different ministries:
The Ministry of Environment (PL), the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction
(PDM), and the Ministry of Healthcare (PLDM). The initial expectation among the donors
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was that functions of these bodies would complement one another. According to the experts
of water management, Ministry of Regional Development should have been in charge of the
water supply, Ministry of Environment – in charge of improving the water quality, while the
laboratory within the Ministry of Healthcare would keep monitoring the water quality.
Unlike these expectations, however, the actual division of responsibilities included a lot of
overlapping functions. Formally, the Ministry of Environment became the line ministry in
charge of water supply and sanitation, however, Ministry of Regional Development was also
assigned some role in this. Soon it became clear that both the environmental and regional
development ministries started competing with each other and promoted a lot of projects
that expanded the water pipeline network into the villages. However, these pipes continued
to provide water that was either contaminated by high level of nitrates or microbial pollution,
since no authority engaged in improving water quality. As an environmental expert from the
local NGO remarked:
“The Ministry of Environment does not want to delegate the water supply and
sanitation to the ministry of regional development because they will lose a lot of
PR. When you open a pipeline this is TV [sic]. On the other hand, water quality
management is related to river management, which is more difficult. . . Pipeline
you manage in one month, river management takes years.” (Authors’ interview,
April 2016, Chisinau)
Another informant from the environmental watchdog similarly highlighted the politicians’
excessive focus on expanding the water supply network, explaining this with the fact that
“pipelines bring votes” (Authors’ interview, April 2016, Chisinau). In private interviews, a
number of donors noted that they were not happy with the duplication of functions. But
also remarked that they could not do much since “it all comes from politics, pure politics”,
pointing to the fact that all parties were interested in gaining immediate publicity, and votes
(Authors’ interview, April 2016, Chisinau).
A former high-ranking official from the Environmental Ministry also corroborated this fact
and named “a lot of patchwork” and the absence of coordination between the ministries as the
major obstacle for improving water quality in Moldova. “[T]his is not a healthy competition
because they [ministries] are competing in the same village without following the established
ruled and guidelines” (Authors’ interview, April 2016, Chisinau).
Similar to many young democracies, Moldova, since gaining independence, has been suffering
from a lack of party institutionalization. Parties are not anchored in the conventional societal
cleavages but instead are built around powerful individuals. The grassroots contribution to
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parties is absent and parties almost entirely depend on the financial resources of their wealthy
backers. Business interests, therefore, have been especially pronounced during the tenure of
the AEI, and various watchdog organizations continued to report about the adoption of laws
favoring entrenched special interests.
In 2012, the Ministry of Transport and Road Infrastructure initiated a law in Parliament,
which envisioned extraction of gravel and sand from the riverbeds, with the declared aim
of deepening the fairway of rivers and allowing large vessels to navigate in Dniester and
Prut rivers. The environmental NGOs strongly criticized the bill and claimed that legalizing
extraction of sand and gravel would be destructive for the river ecosystems, as they would lose
their self-cleaning qualities. Instead, the civil society organizations pointed to the commercial
interests of the construction companies and claimed that the already existing illegal business
of extracting raw materials would now be legalized “under the guise of navigation” (Iaşcenco
and Barbier, 2015). “It’s clear why. The companies involved in the illegal extraction of
sand and gravel make big money from the sale of these materials,” a representative from an
environmental NGO remarked (Ibid). A former high-ranking official from the Environmental
Ministry explained that the Moldovan rivers were not suitable for the large vessels, and
corroborated the existence business interests behind the draft law:
“It [sand and gravel extraction] is a huge business. One cubic meter of sand is
sold for 10 euros, and they are extracting thousands and thousands each day. I
saw the process, I have made the evaluation: [they make] between 50 000 and 100
000 euros each day.” (Authors’ interview, April 2016, Chisinau)
The environmental NGOs with the financial support of the foreign donors (US embassy)
initiated a large-scale campaign to raise awareness among the politicians and the public
about the destructive effect of the bill, and how it would lead to the degradation of the main
sources of drinking water in the country. The Parliament nonetheless adopted the law, and
as the civil society organizations lamented:
“[D]espite of [sic] well developed legal framework on public participation on
governmental and parliamentary levels, it is very difficult now to protect the
public interests in conditions of total corruption of the political majority. [. . . ] We
observed many times that both government and parliament are ready to violate
their own laws and rules in favor of existing criminal groups.” (Eco-Tiras, 2013)
Among various sources of water pollution, experts also pointed to the established practice
among big business enterprises, such as wine and sugar producers, to discharge the industrial
wastewater to rivers. “Fines are very low, so it’s easier to pay the fine of approximately 20 000
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EUR, then to build the wastewater treatment plant that costs 2 million Euros” – an informant
from the scientific community explained (Authors’ interview, April 2016, Chisinau). Other
informants, however, also pointed to the close connections between the business enterprises
and the politicians, and as a consequence - privileged treatment of many of these companies.
“Big companies often belong to parties in the government. . . And they don’t care - inspectors
cannot touch them. Inspectors are told, here you can check, here you cannot, so inspectors
are themselves afraid” (Authors’ interviews with a chair of an environmental NGO and an
environmental scientist, April 2016, Chisinau). In an anonymous interview, an inspector from
the environmental inspectorate also confirmed the fact that they “cannot touch some people”,
otherwise even risking being fired (Authors interview, April 2016, Chisinau). Developing
strong inspectorate in itself is not a priority. It receives little funding, despite strong support
from the donors: “No cars, and even for those few cars, there is no budget for fuel, no boats
to catch poachers, despite a lot of funding from donors” (Authors’ interview, April 2016,
Chisinau).
However, neither the small enterprises nor other actors contributing to the pollution of rivers,
get punished given the pervasiveness of petty corruption among the administrative bodies.
As an inspector explained, inspectorates continue to go underfunded and many inspectors
have no other choice than to supplement their low salaries with an additional income through
bribes.
The presence of petty corruption significantly accelerated the illegal logging problem. Forests
are one of the most effective tools to maintain the water quality since trees serve as natural
sponges, collecting and filtering rainfall (Hamilton, 2008). Deforestation therefore significantly
contributes to the pollution of water sources. In the recent years, however, Moldova has
continued to witness a sharp decrease of the forest areas, partly due to the illegal logging. In
2016, an investigation by the State Audit Office in the Forestry Agency Moldsilva revealed
that the forest security had failed to fulfill its obligation of protecting forest from poachers.
Investigative journalists, as well as environmental experts, have been unanimously pointing
to rampant corruption in the agency, and particularly among the forest guards, as the major
reason behind the massive deforestation. “It is quite obvious the fact that illegal deforestation
takes place with the silent consent of officials who are rewarded for it” (Crime Moldova
(2016), emphasis added; Authors’ interviews, April 2016, Chisinau).
Presence of petty corruption, however, is not the only reason behind the ineffectiveness
of bureaucracy in dealing with water management problems. Politicization of civil service
remains a prevalent problem in Moldova, and several informants argued that given the
political uncertainty, governing parties have been much more interested in filling ‘their’
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respective ministries with loyal - rather than professional – cadres. As an expert from the
donor community explained:
“You see them [bureaucrats] working in a position that does not fit their qualifi-
cations and abilities. . . they are obliged to fulfill [tasks of] their superior who put
them in this position. You see it in the [environmental] ministry; you see it in the
agencies. The most outspoken and reform-minded people were dismissed, and the
new people are implementing agenda of their superiors [sic].” (Authors’ interview,
April 2016, Chisinau)
Another expert from the donor organization added:
“[. . . ] there is a necessity for more potential because when you select people by
political criteria you could not have a good productivity [. . . ]. Please visit the
[web-] site of the ministry and look [for] the CV. There should not only be the
names. [. . . ] There should be CVs. [E]ven in the communist time, one time in
three years they had to pass [. . . ] functional analysis, how the people comply
with their duties. [. . . ] Now they forgot about it [. . . ].” (Authors’ interview, April
2016, Chisinau)
High staff turnover and appointment of non-technical personnel to the positions requiring
technical knowledge led to the continuous loss of institutional memory. Low salaries and
job insecurity in the public service further exacerbated this problem, as many well-trained
cadres opted to leave for private sector (Authors’ interview with an expert providing training
in water management to public servants, April 2016, Chisinau). Politicization of public
service and loss of institutional memory have therefore significantly disrupted the process of
translating donor-funded capacity-building programs into concrete policy actions aimed at
improving water quality.
Admittedly, the media freedom remained high in the country and investigative journalists
brought various large-scale corruption cases into the limelight (including the cases of gravel
and sand extraction business, and illegal logging problem in Moldsilva). However, very
few of these cases were addressed or investigated due to the continuous politicization of
law-enforcement bodies. As the secret annex to the coalition agreement, leaked in 2012,
revealed, leaders of the AEI divided supposedly impartial institutions such as Judiciary,
Anti-Corruption Centre, and Prosecutor’s office along the partisan lines. This offset the
system of checks and balances.
At the outset, fragmentation of power between three parties in the alliance raised hopes for
the emergence of strong checks and balances. But paradoxically the coalition agreement
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thwarted it, as parties in power opted to focus on the short-term political and economic
benefits of politicized institutions, instead of the long-term benefits of investing in impartial
courts, and other law enforcement bodies. As a result, even those big businesses or officials,
exposed for contributing to water pollution, frequently avoided being held accountable for
their actions, given the absence of impartial law-enforcement bodies:
“The division of spoils between the parties has created a system of pseudo “checks
and balances” that in fact leaves no top officials liable for misbehavior. When
corruption cases do reach the courts, frequently they are viewed as selective
retribution against opponents.” (Global Security, 2016)
The law prescribes that decision-makers should consult scientific community regarding such
complex programs as water management, however, the academia does not seem to have much
influence over the political decisions. Suggestions and programs from the Academy of Sciences
seem “to stand on the shelves for years without attention”, according to the interview with
a representative from the academia. After 2009, politicians seem to take opinions of the
Academy less and less into consideration and even consider closing it:
“During the last three years, our financial support dropped by two times. We feel
the pressure from the oligarchs. One of the main arguments to why they want to
close the Academy is that it is not beneficial for them to have someone telling
them what to do.” (Authors’ interview, April 2016, Chisinau)
4 Discussion and conclusions
The aim of the paper has been to investigate the relationship between democracy and quality
of government in their effects on water quality as an example of a public good. While the
level of democracy determines the rules of preference aggregation in the decision-making,
governmental quality shapes implementation of these decisions, and we hypothesized that
these two sets of political institutions interact in determining public service delivery. We
performed a nested analysis and first tested our hypothesis using time-series cross-sectional
data on water quality in countries around the globe. Afterwards, we conducted a study of
a typical case to tease out and illustrate the micro-mechanisms at work behind one of the
relationship patterns.
The large-N analysis has shown that democratic institutions do not seem to always be beneficial
for securing high water quality. The findings rather support the theoretical expectations that
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the effect of democracy on water quality depends on countries’ ability to implement tasks
and deliver public services. More democracy seems to benefit water quality only when quality
of government is relatively high. When quality of government is low, more democracy only
seems to be associated with higher pollution in countries’ inland waters.
In-depth investigation of Moldova as a typical case - a democracy with low governmental
quality - revealed the micro-mechanisms of how poor institutional quality can disrupt the
positive effects of democracy. Democracies with weak quality of government seem to be
dominated by short time horizons, where there is no place for long-term commitments, such
as raising and maintaining high water quality. As the analysis revealed, when it comes to
people’s access to safe drinking water, democratic leaders with short time horizons tend to
put emphasis on access to water rather than safety of water, investing more into building
water pipes instead of using these resources to address water pollution and safeguard actual
quality of water.
The analysis also showed that both petty and grand corruption erode the democratic political
system. The latter allows business interest to step in and influence decision-making, distracting
attention of the politicians from public goods provision and serve private interests instead. In
the case of water management, public interest and the interest of businesses seem to clash and
with the dominance of the latter in the political decision-making, the interests of the public
suffer. Petty corruption in public administration undermines compliance, and in the case
of Moldova, it led to poor monitoring and inspections resulting in extensive illegal logging
that contributed to the poor water quality in local rivers. Politicization of civil service seems
to have also negatively affected the performance of bureaucracies and increased the staff
turnover. This led to the loss of institutional memory, which hampered implementation of
such long-term projects as reaching safe drinking water quality levels.
Another mechanism that seems to disrupt the functioning of democratic institutions in water
provision is insufficient level of checks and balances. In the case of Moldova, despite the
seemingly fragmented government and strong media freedom, the system of checks and
balances is absent, and business representatives and officials who are responsible for illegal
actions leading to higher water pollution, do not face charges, due to the lack of impartial
judicial system. The voice of the scientific community who is supposed to guide politicians in
decision-making regarding water management also seems to be regularly silenced.
Other findings revealed during the large-N analysis show that authoritarian regimes with
high quality of government pollute water more than authoritarian countries with low QoG.
For example, Yemen and Azerbaijan, which both seem to have low QoG, have lower levels of
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water pollution than Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which score higher on QoG indicators. First,
it might seem that these findings can be attributed to oil production and higher economic
development which is known to contribute to higher pollution until a certain point (see
e.g., Grossman and Krueger, 1994), however, these effects should have been taken care of
in our models when we control for countries’ level of GDP per capita. We suggest that the
underlying micro-mechanisms behind this relationship should be investigated in more detail
in the further research.
The contribution of the paper is two-fold. First, the findings offer an important specification
to the previous research on democracy and public goods provision: more democracy seem to
only be beneficial for the delivery of public goods when the quality of institutions shaping
implementation of public policies is sufficient enough to execute the official goals. When
institutional quality is low, more democratic states seem to provide even fewer public goods
to its citizens than less free political systems. These findings do not imply that democracy is
unimportant, but rather that its positive effects should be seen as dependent on the capacity
of the state to implement its official goals, shaped by the quality of institutions guiding
such implementation. The second contribution of the paper - the qualitative investigation
of the micro-mechanisms behind the relationship on the typical case of Moldova - revealed
that institutions specifically detrimental to the performance of democracies in public goods
provision include grand and petty corruption, poorly designed and inefficient public admin-
istration, and lack of checks and balances. Combined with instability in the government,
these institutions both hamper implementation of public policies and adoption of public
policies by stimulating short time horizons in the political system, which guide choices of the
public officials away from the provision of universal public goods in favor of private gains
that benefit them in the short term.
25
5 References
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2006) Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy.
Cambridge University Press.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity,
and poverty. New York: Crown Publishers.
Bartels, B. (2008) Beyond‘ fixed versus random effects’: a framework for improving substantive
and statistical analysis of panel, time-series cross-sectional, and multilevel data. The Society
for Political Methodology, 1–43.
Bäck, H. and Hadenius, A. (2008) Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped
Relationship. Governance, 21(1) 1–24.
Bell, A. and Jones, K. (2015) Explaining fixed effects: Random effects modeling of time-series
cross-sectional and panel data. Political Science Research and Methods, 3(01) 133–153.
Boräng, F., Jagers, S.C. and Povitkina, M. (2016) Political determinants of electricity
provision in small island developing states. Energy Policy, 98 725–734.
Botnaru, P. (2014) In Moldova, poor water supply exposes villagers to epidemics.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2003) The logic of political survival. Cambridge, Mass. ; London:
MIT Press.
Charron, N. and Lapuente, V. (2010) Does democracy produce quality of government?
European Journal of Political Research, 49(4) 443–470.
Charron, N. and Lapuente, V. (2011) Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?
Studies in Comparative International Development, 46(4) 397–423.
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S.I., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard,
M., Fish M., S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Knutsen, C.H., Marquardt, K., McMann, K., Miri,
F., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Staton, J., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y.-t. and Zimmerman, B. (2016)
V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v6.2 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project
(ed.).
Cornell, A. (2014) Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic
Governance Programs. Governance, 27(2) 191–214.
Crime Moldova (2016) Moldsilva Agency or of a well-rooted corruption. Crime Moldova.
Crowther, W. (2013) Moldova. In: Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, Kevin Deegan-Krause,
26
Terje Knutsen (eds.) The handbook of political change in eastern europe. 3rd edition Edward
Elgar Publishing,
Dahlström, C., Lindvall, J. and Rothstein, B. (2013) Corruption, bureaucratic failure and
social policy priorities. Political Studies, 61(3) 523–542.
Damania, R., Fredriksson, P.G. and List, J.A. (2003) Trade liberalization, corruption, and
environmental policy formation: theory and evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 46(3) 490–512.
Deacon, R.T. (2009) Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy. Public Choice,
139(1-2) 241–262.
Duca, G. (2014) Management of Water Quality in Moldova. Springer International Publishing.
Eco-Tiras (2013) The project to improve the environmental rule of law in Moldova.
Evans, P. and Rauch, J.E. (1999) Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of
the effects of‘ Weberian’ state structures on economic growth. American sociological review,
748–765.
FAO (2016) AQUASTAT Main Database.
Fukuyama, F. (2011) The origins of political order: From prehuman times to the French
Revolution. New York: Farrat, Straus; Giroux.
Fukuyama, F. (2013) What Is Governance? Governance, 26(3) 347–368.
Gerring, J., Bond, P., Barndt, W.T. and Moreno, C. (2005) Democracy and economic growth:
A historical perspective. World Politics, 57(03) 323–364.
Gerring, J., Thacker, S.C. and Alfaro, R. (2012) Democracy and human development. The
Journal of Politics, 74(01) 1–17.
Gleditsch, K.S. (2011) Expanded Trade and GDP Data.
Global Security (2016) Moldova - Corruption. Global Security.
Grossman, G.M. and Krueger, A.B. (1994) Economic growth and the environment. National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Hadenius, A. and Teorell, J. (2005) Assessing Alternative Indices of Democracy. C&M
Working Papers 6, IPSA, August 2005,
Haggard, S. (1991) Inflation and Stabilization. In: Gerald M Meler (ed.) Politics and policy
making in developing countries: Perspectives on the new political economy. San Francisco:
27
ICS Press, 233–249.
Hamilton, L.S. (2008) Forests and water: a thematic study prepared in the framework of the
Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005. 78.
Hanson, J.K. (2015) Democracy and State Capacity: Complements or Substitutes? Studies
in Comparative International Development, 50(3) 304–330.
Helliwell, J.F. (1994) Empirical linkages between democracy and economic growth. British
journal of political science, 24(02) 225–248.
Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2012) Penn World Table Version 7.1 Income Center
for International Comparisons of Production, Prices (eds.).
Hicken, A. (2011) Clientelism. Annual Review of Political Science, 14 289–310.
Hsu, A., Emerson, J., Levy, M., Sherbinin, A. de, Johnson, L., Malik, O. and Jaiteh, M.
(2014) The 2014 Environmental Performance Index.
Huntington, S.P. (1968) Modernization and corruption. In: Arnold J Heidenheimer, Michael
Johnston, Victor LeVine (eds.) Political order in changing societies. New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 377–388.
Huntington, S.P. (1991) The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century. 4.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Iaşcenco, T. and Barbier, N. (2015) Illegal sand extraction from the Nistru and Prut Rivers:
some get wealthy while the country has losses. Chisinau: Centre for Investigative Journalism
of Moldova ‘Anticoruptie’.
ICRG (2014) A Business Guide to Political Risk for International Decisions. New York: The
PRS Group. International Country Risk Guide.
Keefer, P. (2007) Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies.
American Journal of Political Science, 51(4) 804–821.
Kitschelt, H. (2000) Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities. Com-
parative Political Studies, 33(6-7) 845–879.
Knutsen, C.H. (2013) Democracy, State Capacity, and Economic Growth. World development,
43 1–18.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1999) The quality of
28
government. Journal of Law, Economics, and organization, 15(1) 222–279.
Lake, D.A. and Baum, M.A. (2001) The invisible hand of democracy: political control and
the provision of public services. Comparative Political Studies, 34(6) 587–621.
Li, Q. and Reuveny, R. (2006) Democracy and Environmental Degradation. International
Studies Quarterly, 50(4) 935–956.
Lieberman, E.S. (2005) Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative
Research. American Political Science Review, 99(03) 435–452.
López, R. and Mitra, S. (2000) Corruption, Pollution, and the Kuznets Environment Curve.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 40(2) 137–150.
McGuire, J.W. (2010) Wealth, health, and democracy in East Asia and Latin America.
Cambridge University Press.
McGuire, M.C. and Olson, M. (1996) The economics of autocracy and majority rule: the
invisible hand and the use of force. Journal of economic literature, 34(1) 72–96.
Meister, S. (2011) A Turning Point for Moldova? A challenge for the EU and Moldova.
DGAP analyse May 2011, 3.
Miller, G. (2000) Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of
Public Agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10(2) 289–328.
Min, B. (2015) Power and the Vote: Elections and Electricity in the Developing World.
Cambridge University Press.
Mundlak, Y. (1978) On the pooling of time series and cross section data. Econometrica:
journal of the Econometric Society, 69–85.
Pemstein, D., Marquardt, K., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y.-t. and Miri, F. (2015) The V-Dem
Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-
Coded Data.
Przeworski, A. (2000) Democracy and development: political institutions and material well-
being in the world, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rabe-Hesketh, S., Skrondal, A. and Pickles, A. (2005) Maximum likelihood estimation of
limited and discrete dependent variable models with nested random effects. Journal of
Econometrics, 128(2) 301–323.
Ross, M. (2006) Is democracy good for the poor? American Journal of Political Science,
29
50(4) 860–874.
Rothstein, B. (1998) Just institutions matter: the moral and political logic of the universal
welfare state. Cambridge University Press.
Rothstein, B. (2011) The quality of government: corruption, social trust, and inequality in
international perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. (2008) What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial
Government Institutions. Governance, 21(2) 165–190.
Rothstein, B., Samanni, M. and Teorell, J. (2012) Explaining the welfare state: power
resources vs. the Quality of Government. European Political Science Review, 4(01) 1–28.
Sen, A. (1999) Development as freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sikkink, K. (1991) Ideas and institutions: developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. New
York: Cornell University Press.
State Chancellery of Moldova (2013) Development Cooperation – 2012 Annual Report.
Chisinau: State Chancellery of Moldova.
Walton, G.W. (2013) Is all corruption dysfunctional? Perceptions of corruption and its
consequences in Papua New Guinea. Public Administration and Development, 33(3) 175–190.
World Bank (2015) World Development Indicators, the World Bank.
Zarazaga, R.S. (2014) Brokers Beyond Clientelism: A New Perspective Through the Argentine
Case. Latin American Politics and Society, 56(3) 23–45.
30
Appendix A. Interview questions
1. We are interested in the reforms in Moldova from 2009 onwards after the Alliance came
to power. Could you give us a general overview of the reforms in the water management
sector? What was the reform about?
2. What is the role of your organization in supporting the reform (to donor communities)
3. What are the major problems/obstacles in implementing water management reform?
4. What are the major sources of pollution in rivers? Who pollutes?
5. Are there limitations on (a) polluting industries and regulations on (b) agricultural
practices that might effect pesticides/accumulation of chemicals in water bodies.
6. If yes, who monitors the process? Are there:
1) Legal framework
2) Inspectors, who can monitor compliance?
3) What is inspectorate’s capacity to measure? Do they have the necessary technol-
ogy/labs?
4) Are there fines for pollution?
5) How does enforcement process looks like?
If the interviewees mention unwillingness to enforce:
7. Where does the unwillingness come from? Does it stem from the political/business
interests? Do politicians have disincentives to uphold laws because of the:
1) stake in businesses;
2) political funding coming from businessmen in industry;
3) they just don’t know/have ordinance.
8. What are the impediments from the administrative side in implementing the reform?
Mention:
• having enough staff
• the level of training of the staff
• ability to retain qualified staff (salary/motivation)
• having the necessary technical equipment to conduct their job: – as basic as
computers and printers, – and more advanced – monitoring equipment and lab.
equipment
• having access to information about the state of the environment:
– having someone gathering the information
– does those who gather information share it?
– having a unified measurement system for every issue (e.g., same measure for
measuring water quality in Prust and Danube to compare)
• coordination and communication between different agencies responsible for the
same issue
• how does corruption manifest itself?
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Appendix B. Summary statistics and correlation be-
tween the variables
Table B.1. Summary statistics for the years of the dependent variable availability.
BOD as the dependent variable
Variable Obs N of countries Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BOD per capita 953 102 7.61 4.62 0.01 22.47
BOD per capita (ln) 953 102 1.70 1.03 -5.12 3.11
BOD/water resources (ln) 722 82 7.46 1.90 1.03 11.65
QoG, rescaled 826 89 6.79 2.13 0.97 10.00
Democracy. V-dem. rescaled 868 96 6.54 2.68 0.29 9.43
Freedom House/Polity IV 953 102 7.40 2.99 0.25 10.00
Corruption, V-dem, rescaled 868 96 4.01 2.88 .09 9.46
GDP per capita 953 102 15040.14 13541.51 425.51 101078.00
GDP per capita (ln) 953 102 9.10 1.18 6.05 11.52
Population density 953 102 222.16 763.93 1.59 6602.30
Population density (ln) 953 102 4.26 1.32 0.46 8.80
Urban Population 953 102 61.53 21.52 10.24 100.00
Land area 953 102 756941.10 2193357.00 320.00 16400000.00
Land area (ln) 953 102 11.82 2.03 5.77 16.61
Latitude 953 102 0.41 0.19 0.01 0.71
Internal renewable
water resources 722 82 263.16 605.88 0.05 2850.00
Table B.2. Summary statistics for the years of the dependent variable availability.
Level of wastewater treatment as the dependent variable
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wastewater treatment 178 24.88 31.41 0.00 99.65
QoG, rescaled 138 5.37 2.02 0.83 10
Democracy, V-dem, rescaled 161 5.64 2.54 0.27 9.55
Freedom House/Polity IV 178 6.49 3.09 0.25 10.00
Corruption, V-dem 161 5.22 2.80 0.09 9.40
GDP per capita 178 11903.90 14037.21 273.15 97904.79
GDP per capita (ln) 178 8.70 1.27 5.61 11.49
Population density 178 171.37 571.03 1.75 7231.77
Population density (ln) 178 4.14 1.36 0.56 8.89
Urban Population 177 55.85 22.95 9.09 100.00
Land area 178 725547.50 1911604.00 320.00 16400000.00
Land area (ln) 178 11.71 2.24 5.77 16.61
Latitude 178 0.29 0.19 0.00 0.72
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Table B.3. Correlation Table
BOD/
cap.
BOD/
wat. res.
W.wat.
tr. QoG
Dem.,
V-dem
FH/
Pol.IV
Corr,
V-dem
GDP/
capita
Pop.
dens.
Urban
Pop. Area Lat.
Wat.
res.
BOD/capita (ln) 1.00
BOD/water resources (ln) 0.29 1.00
Wastewater treatment 0.62 0.27 1.00
QoG, rescaled 0.66 0.07 0.75 1.00
Democracy, V-dem, rescaled 0.47 -0.20 0.53 0.61 1.00
Freedom House/Polity IV 0.46 -0.20 0.42 0.54 0.96 1.00
Corruption, V-dem, rescaled -0.61 -0.07 -0.72 -0.88 -0.74 -0.68 1.00
GDP/capita (ln) 0.69 0.22 0.74 0.76 0.58 0.53 -0.79 1.00
Population density (ln) 0.22 0.46 0.21 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 1.00
Urban Population 0.53 0.18 0.68 0.63 0.44 0.41 -0.65 0.76 -0.03 1.00
Land area (ln) -0.24 -0.41 -0.20 -0.22 -0.12 -0.15 0.15 -0.32 -0.41 -0.19 1.00
Latitude 0.60 0.22 0.73 0.69 0.54 0.50 -0.64 0.64 -0.01 0.53 -0.15 1.00
Internal renewable
water resources 0.05 -0.71 -0.03 0.03 0.21 0.17 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 0.69 -0.08 1.00
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Appendix C. Coutries used in the analysis in Table 2
1 Albania 44 Norway 87 Australia
2 Argentina 45 Pakistan (1971-) 88 Armenia
3 Austria 46 Panama 89 Brazil
4 Bangladesh 47 Paraguay 90 Myanmar
5 Belgium 48 Philippines 91 Belarus
6 Bolivia 49 Poland 92 Cameroon
7 Botswana 50 Portugal 93 Congo
8 Bulgaria 51 Qatar 94 Congo, Democratic Republic
9 Canada 52 Romania 95 Costa Rica
10 Sri Lanka 53 Saudi Arabia 96 Cuba
11 Chile 54 Senegal 97 El Salvador
12 China 55 Vietnam 98 Gabon
13 Colombia 56 South Africa 99 Guatemala
14 Cyprus (1975-)* 57 Zimbabwe 100 Guinea
15 Denmark 58 Spain 101 Guyana
16 Dominican Republic 59 Sweden 102 Honduras
17 Ecuador 60 Syria 103 Iceland
18 Finland 61 Thailand 104 India
19 France (1963-) 62 Trinidad and Tobago 105 Cote d’Ivoire
20 Gambia 63 Turkey 106 Jamaica
21 Germany 64 Uganda 107 Kenya
22 Ghana 65 Egypt 108 Liberia
23 Greece 66 United Kingdom 109 Libya
24 Haiti 67 Tanzania 110 Mali
25 Hungary 68 United States 111 Mozambique
26 Indonesia 69 Yemen 112 Namibia
27 Iran 70 Azerbaijan** 113 Nicaragua
28 Iraq 71 Croatia 114 Niger
29 Ireland 72 Czech Republic 115 Nigeria
30 Israel 73 Ethiopia (1993-) 116 Papua New Guinea
31 Italy 74 Ethiopia (-1992) 117 Peru
32 Japan 75 Estonia 118 Guinea-Bissau
33 Jordan 76 Kazakhstan 119 Serbia
34 Korea, South 77 Latvia 120 Sierra Leone
35 Lebanon 78 Lithuania 121 Somalia
36 Madagascar 79 Moldova 122 Suriname
37 Malawi 80 Russia 123 Switzerland
38 Malaysia (1966-) 81 Slovakia 124 Togo
39 Mexico 82 Slovenia 125 Tunisia
40 Mongolia 83 Sudan (-2011) 126 Burkina Faso
41 Morocco 84 Ukraine 127 Uruguay
42 Netherlands 85 Algeria*** 128 Venezuela
43 New Zealand 86 Angola 129 Zambia
Countries 1-69 are present in all models
∗ for the methodology on the divisions of country-years, see Teorell et al. (2016)
∗∗ Countries 70-84 are not included in models 3-6 due to data availability
∗∗ Countries 85-129 are only included in models 7-8 due to data availability
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Appendix D. Robustness checks
Table D.1. Democracy (Freedom House/Polity IV), quality of government and
water quality
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Between-part
Democracy 0.062∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.056 0.305∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ 0.241 -0.696 -4.265∗∗
(0.026) (0.081) (0.035) (0.092) (0.077) (0.211) (0.677) (1.404)
QoG 0.013 0.359∗∗ 0.118 0.432∗∗∗ 0.083 0.706∗∗ 7.618∗∗∗ 2.102
(0.073) (0.113) (0.091) (0.089) (0.201) (0.270) (1.273) (2.415)
Democracy∗QoG -0.047∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.091∗∗ 0.698∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.035) (0.273)
GDP per capita (log) 0.448∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗ 0.379∗∗ 0.556† 0.588† 3.203† 3.887∗
(0.124) (0.121) (0.136) (0.135) (0.317) (0.308) (1.839) (1.786)
Population density (log) 0.130∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.142∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 4.005∗∗ 4.280∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.056) (0.137) (0.130) (1.428) (1.402)
Urban population -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.234∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.085) (0.083)
Area (log) 0.030 0.045 0.045 0.016 -0.138 -0.136 1.324 1.101
(0.036) (0.035) (0.073) (0.084) (0.101) (0.106) (1.073) (1.094)
Latitude 1.464∗∗ 2.040∗∗∗ 0.438 1.390 2.199 4.027∗ 48.748∗∗∗ 42.530∗∗∗
(0.490) (0.482) (0.695) (0.886) (1.451) (1.683) (11.314) (11.792)
Water resources (log) 0.007 0.032
(0.047) (0.053)
Within-part
Democracy 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.009
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
QoG -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Democracy∗QoG -0.006 -0.008 -0.006
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
GDP per capita (log) 0.121 0.122 0.144 0.143 0.166 0.166
(0.130) (0.130) (0.158) (0.157) (0.158) (0.158)
Population density (log) 0.323 0.325 0.290 0.291 1.186∗∗ 1.190∗∗
(0.345) (0.344) (0.405) (0.404) (0.394) (0.394)
Urban population 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant -3.757∗∗∗ -5.833∗∗∗ -3.610∗ -5.287∗∗∗ 3.104 -0.963 -96.117∗∗∗ -72.592∗∗
(1.068) (1.169) (1.421) (1.471) (2.791) (3.103) (22.044) (25.512)
Observations 826 826 693 693 693 693 137 137
R2 between 0.65 0.70 0.62 0.66 0.45 0.50 0.74 0.75
R2 within 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.18
Number of ccode 89 89 74 74 74 74 137 137
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.05, †p<0.1. Model 1-4: DV: BOD per capita.
Model 5-6: DV: BOD relative to internal renewable water resources. Model 7-8: DV: level of wastewater treatment
relative to population connected to sewage. OLS for cross-country sample for 2014 with all independent variables
lagged 4 years
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Figure D.1. Conditional marginal effects of democracy and quality of government
on water quality
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